Both traditions descend from mid-twentieth-century American liberalism and went separate ways at recognisable moments. Neoconservatism took shape in the 1960s and 1970s break between liberal-internationalist intellectuals and the New Left over foreign policy, cultural change, and the welfare state. Progressivism in the contemporary American sense traces back further (to the Progressive Era reforms of the 1890s-1920s) but the post-1968 reform program is what neoconservatives rejected and what contemporary progressives have been carrying forward. The two traditions share enough institutional-democratic commitments to produce surprising contemporary coalitions and disagree on enough that the underlying argument is still live in 2026.
TL;DR
- Both descend from mid-twentieth-century American liberalism; both retain liberal-democratic constitutional commitments.
- Neoconservatism prioritises muscular defense of the post-1945 liberal-democratic order abroad and market-friendly domestic policy; progressivism prioritises active state intervention to deliver social-reform outcomes.
- The post-2016 Republican break with neoconservatism has produced unusual coalitions between former neoconservatives and Democrats on liberal-democratic procedural commitments.
Side-by-side
| Dimension | Neo-Conservatism | Progressivism |
|---|---|---|
| Foreign-policy framework | Active American leadership in democracy promotion, alliance maintenance, pushback against authoritarian powers | Mixed; supportive of liberal-democratic resistance to authoritarianism but more skeptical of military intervention |
| Position on welfare state | Skeptical of post-1968 expansion; defends limited welfare-state infrastructure | Active expansion of social insurance, antitrust, climate investment |
| Position on cultural change | Skeptical of post-1968 cultural transformation | Carrier of post-1968 civil-rights, women's-rights, LGBTQ-rights expansion |
| Founding texts | Kristol's Two Cheers for Capitalism (1978); Kirkpatrick's Dictatorships and Double Standards (1979); Kagan's Of Paradise and Power (2003) | Croly's The Promise of American Life (1909); Lippmann's Drift and Mastery (1914); Klein and Thompson's Abundance (2025) |
| Institutional home | AEI, the Bulwark, Commentary, the centrist-conservative foreign-policy network | Roosevelt Institute, Center for American Progress, EPI, the Working Families Party |
| Live test | Ukraine 2022-present; the Bulwark's effort to recover neoconservative influence | The Inflation Reduction Act's durability; the post-2024 American political environment |
Where they agree
Both retain procedural commitments to liberal-democratic infrastructure: free elections, judicial independence, multi-party competition, civil-liberties protection. The post-2016 American political environment has put this shared commitment under unusual pressure, and the resulting coalitions between former neoconservatives and progressives in defense of constitutional structure have been one of the more interesting contemporary political developments. The Bulwark project and Anne Applebaum's writing are the institutional bridge most often visible in mainstream commentary.
Both accept the post-1945 international institutional infrastructure (NATO, the UN system, the broader alliance and democracy-promotion network) as worth defending. The contemporary Ukraine debate has produced operational convergence: neoconservative writers like Robert Kagan and Eliot Cohen have made the muscular-internationalist case for American support of Ukraine, and progressive writers in the broader Democratic Party policy ecosystem have made parallel cases through different framings. The shared commitment to defending liberal-democratic resistance to authoritarian aggression has been more durable than the partisan-coalitional alignment.
Both treat the post-2016 populist-right turn as a serious threat to the constitutional-democratic order they share commitments to. The neoconservative reading runs through the Bulwark writers' assessment of the post-2016 Republican Party; the progressive reading runs through Klein, Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson's Abundance, and the broader contemporary Democratic Party policy ecosystem. The shared threat assessment has produced operational coalitions that would have been unimaginable in 2012.
Both have been working out how to address the post-1980 erosion of working-class wages and bargaining power. The neoconservative engagement has been more cautious and partial; the progressive engagement has been more programmatic. The contemporary American Compass-style economic-nationalist coalition has drawn on both, and the operational convergence on the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act has been visible across the centrist-and-progressive policy ecosystem.
Where they diverge
The deepest divergence is foreign-policy framing. Neoconservatism is committed to active American leadership in democracy promotion, alliance maintenance, and pushback against authoritarian powers; the Reagan-Bush foreign-policy program and the 2003 Iraq War were the canonical policy expressions. Progressivism is more skeptical of military intervention, more attentive to the costs of post-1945 American foreign-policy infrastructure, and more willing to engage with critiques of American hegemony from the broader anti-imperialist tradition. The 2003 Iraq War was decisive for both traditions in opposite ways: for neoconservatism, it hollowed out the political position; for progressivism, it was the organising failure that shaped subsequent skepticism of post-1945 American foreign-policy infrastructure.
The domestic-policy position diverges. Neoconservatism is broadly market-friendly on economic policy, skeptical of post-1968 welfare-state expansion, and supportive of limited regulatory infrastructure. Progressivism is committed to active state intervention through regulation, antitrust, climate investment, and expanded social insurance. The contemporary American debate over Medicare expansion, the child tax credit, the federal jobs guarantee, and the broader social-insurance program is where the underlying redistributive divergence is most visible.
The position on cultural change diverges. Neoconservatism was shaped by skepticism of the post-1968 cultural transformation: the New Left's positions on race, gender, sexuality, and education. The contemporary tradition has been more flexible on some of these questions than the founding generation was but retains a broadly skeptical orientation. Progressivism is the carrier of the post-1968 civil-rights, women's-rights, and LGBTQ-rights expansion as foundational political commitments. The contemporary culture-war debates are where the underlying divergence is most operationally visible.
The political-coalitional realities diverge. Neoconservatism has been politically homeless since the 2016 Republican break. The Bulwark, AEI, and various centrist-conservative organizations carry the tradition forward; the partisan-political vehicle has been unstable. Progressivism operates inside the Democratic Party coalition and the broader foundation-funded policy world with deep institutional infrastructure and an active partisan-political base. The contemporary American political environment has put both traditions under pressure but in different ways.
The relationship to specific policy questions diverges in significant detail. The contemporary American debate over public-investment industrial policy has produced operational convergence; the debate over the role of universal individual rights, the contemporary culture-war questions, and the role of state-funded social insurance has produced operational divergence. The shape of any post-2024 American center-left coalition will depend partly on which of these debates dominates the political environment.
Who tends to hold each view
Self-identified neoconservatives today are concentrated in centrist-conservative intellectual infrastructure: AEI, the Bulwark project, Commentary, various democracy-promotion organizations (Freedom House, NED), the broader centrist-conservative foreign-policy network. Bill Kristol, Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, and Bret Stephens are the most visible contemporary intellectual carriers. Many traditional neoconservatives have defected from the Republican Party coalition into centrist positions inside or adjacent to the Democratic coalition. Others have become politically homeless.
Self-identified progressives today cluster around the post-2008 Democratic Party current, the Center for American Progress, the Roosevelt Institute, the Economic Policy Institute, the Working Families Party, the Justice Democrats, and the broader foundation-funded policy world. Elizabeth Warren, AOC, Ezra Klein, Heather McGhee, and the broader contemporary progressive intellectual infrastructure carry the tradition forward.
What the Votely quiz would say
The Votely quiz places Neo-Conservatism in the EM-GM macro-cell and Progressivism in the EL-GL. They sit close on the economic axis (with Progressivism more left-economic) but differ on governance (with Neoconservatism more moderate-authority-oriented). The macro-cell adjacency reflects the shared liberal-democratic foundation; the sub-axis differences show up in the foreign-policy and domestic-policy divergences this dossier walks through. Take the quiz to see whether your domestic-policy commitments compose with your foreign-policy commitments in the neoconservative or the progressive direction, which is often where the underlying tradition-level alignment becomes visible.